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which Hume withdrew after 176o, and which he in 1753 described as "too frivolous" 
to be included with the rest of  his essays? And what of  his deletion, after ten editions 
(not three, as Livingston says), of  all but three paragraphs of  the first Enquiry discus- 
sion of  the association of  ideas, another textual segment on which the present inter- 
pretation depends? Whether  we read Hume narratively or conventionally these al- 
terations in the corpus are too significant to be ignored or dismissed as merely 
stylistic. 
I raise these questions because I hope that Livingston will in due course respond 
to them. He has provided us with an interpretive study of  great scope and, as I 
believe time will show, fecundity. But the interpretation is not finished; as it stands it 
raises issues which Livingston himself must address if his readers are to be able to 
build on his work. That  this should be so is not surprising given the scope and 
originality of  this work, but based on this beginning I look forward to Livingston's 
further explications of  Hume's  philosophy of  common life. 
DAVID FATE NORTON 
Institute for Advanced Study 
Princeton University 
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Alan White notes that Schelling is a philosopher who has become obscure, one no 
longer included in our  operative consciousness of  the history of  philosophy. And 
even were he in our living memory,  the metaphysical categories and constructions 
Schelling pursued would seem questionable and of  questionable pertinence to our 
situation. But as Werner  Marx reminds us, "the old questions present themselves 
ever anew," and among them are certainly questions about the possibility of  human 
freedom and about the nature and meaning of  history. Each of  these concise studies 
is devoted to removing the obscurity and to the portrayal of  the intriguing fifty-year 
career of  the 'Last Metaphysician', who was ever challenged by the tension he experi- 
enced between the demands o f  system and those o f  freedom. And each of  them 
achieves its goal with remarkable clarity and philosophical vigor. 
There  are no deep differences in Marx's and White's interpretation of  Schelling. 
The starting point of  his philosophy is an ideological commitment to defend human 
freedom precisely by reconciling the natural and the moral worlds which Kant had 
left sundered. But the transcendental construction of  human experience as a totality 
(the absolute, if you will) brings with it its own difficulties. When the philosopher 
descends from the indeterminacy of  the absolute to the determinate knowing self, 
the intermediate structures of  limitation and finitude take on the cast of  law and 
physical necessitation, and freedom disappears. Then there is the other problem of 
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whether the philosopher can systematically deduce determinacy out of  indetermi- 
nacy, the finite from the absolute. These two problems bedevil Schelling his whole 
life long, the dialectic of  freedom and necessity and the dialectic of  the absolute and 
the individual. White is correct in seeing Schelling's significance as negative. He tried, 
and publically failed, to resurrect metaphysics first as ontology, then as theology, but 
in doing so he introduced a new generation of  thinkers, among them Kierkegaard 
and Engels, to anthropological or existential themes. The very frankness of  his an- 
thropomorhic attempts to think God would seem to move his audience rather readily 
into admitting that we really do have only ourselves to think about. 
Marx chooses limited systematic topics in the three essays collected here, but by 
confining his attention to the 18oo System of Transcendental Idealism and the 18o 9 Essay 
on Human Freedom, he is able to underline Schelling's significant themes and problems. 
It is interesting to note that White chooses to emphasize the same two works. His first 
essay contrasts the explicitly teleological, indeed theological, foundations of  the theory 
of  history enunciated in the 18oo system with the problematic, apparently unfounded 
teleology of  Habermas's vision of  history as voiced in Erkenntnis und Interesse. Schelling 
viewed history as the highest objectification of  the will, the plane wherein its rationality 
was no longer obscured by the arbitrary nature of  individuals' acts and choices. Here 
freedom is embodied in and supported by a mechanical order which Schelling calls "a 
second and higher nature." Freedom and necessity conflict. Schelling postulates a 
"highest synthesis" that binds together freedom and necessity and integrates the will of  
individual agents into a world-historical teleological process. Marx notes that this syn- 
thesis is beyond the reach of  individual consciousnesss, and that with this necessitarian 
denial of  the rationality of  human agency, Schelling's whole system falls into contradic- 
tion, for the system was supposed to be founded on freedom and be nothing other 
than the outworking of  freedom's deeds. Alas, the contradiction is not confined to one 
book; it vitiates the philosopher's whole career which seems to be a perpetually unsuc- 
cessful dialogue between Kant and Spinoza on human freedom. Schelling never sorted 
out the terminology and defined what ' freedom' meant. Spontaneity, caprice, voli- 
tional indifference, self-determination, self-rule, Kant's autonomy, deliberation, ability 
to resist desire, ability to change desirability--these are only some of  the candidates. 
Kantian freedom made into a system principle is unlikely to deliver the freedom moral 
agents impute to themselves. 
Marx devotes a second essay to a comparison between Schelling's 18oo System and 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. His supposition is that the two works are parallel and 
differ only in the way they seek to solve a commonly held vision of  the task of  
philosophy, enunciated by Hegel in 18ol as "d/e Aufhebung der Entzweiung"--the 
resolution of  dichotomies common to ordinary consciousness and to traditional phi- 
losophy alike, oppositions between subjectivity and objectivity, between reason and 
action, between intelligence and nature. Marx is peculiarly concerned to vindicate 
Schelling's methodological principle, intellectual intuition. With the third essay Marx 
returns to the freedom theme, noting that in the 18o 9 Essay on Human Freedom 
Schelling attributes a sort of  moral freedom to the absolute. Schelling pictures the 
developed godhead as a personal God standing over against an independent world, a 
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world which is a product  of  his freedom and self-development. Marx distinguishes 
three moments in this moral freedom: (1) freedom as the ability to begin, productiv- 
ity, or spontaneity (as in the 18oo system), (2) freedom as voluntary binding of  
oneself to a necessity, self-determination or  Spinozistic freedom, (3) the freedom 
Kant ascribed to pure will, autonomy, or 'personality'. 
White's account of  Schelling differs from Marx's in that he offers a chronological 
overview of  the whole of  Schelling's long career. He correctly sees that it is problems, 
not solutions, that predominate in Schelling's thought, that the problem of  freedom 
is primary and abiding. He also appreciates how Schelling's early systems founder on 
the the problem of  the derivation of  the finite. I f  on some hyperempirical level, 
everything is deeply and marvelously one, how did we get here? That  we in fact are 
here is not a good answer. The  limitations involved in individuality and finitude must 
be systematically derived. 
MICHAEL G. VATER 
Marquette University 
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Ever since the first World War there have been those who have accused Hegel of  
fathering 'Prussian~sm'/ and, since the second World War, even National Socialism, ~ 
in spite of  arguments to the contrary of  such writers as Bernard Bosanquet, John  
Muirhead, and Sir Malcolm Knox. 3 He has also been accused of  servility to the 
Prussian authorities of  his time. But, to say nothing of  the earlier writers I have 
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